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Introduction
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), the United States
Supreme Court ruled that government could not limit corporate political spending in
elections arguing that such limitations would violate the free speech rights of
corporations. With this ruling, the Court has set a new standard for corporate First
Amendment rights.
A corporation does not in and of itself speak to its own causes and interests. A
corporation is grounded in the voices and actions of a revolving cast of board of directors
and shareholders. By allowing corporations the freedom to use general treasury funds for
near limitless electoral advocacy, the Court has single handedly rewritten campaign
finance laws and stare decisis. As a result, individuals running corporations have been
given a voice that carries far greater impact than that of their personal electoral voice due
to the brand power of the corporation and the sizeable source of funds that corporations
enjoy over that of individuals. Corporations both foreign and domestic now have the
ability to influence elections and in effect, public policy at levels previously thought
unattainable. The effect of this ruling will have a lasting impact on corporate speech in
the United States.
The Citizens United case centers around the nonprofit corporation Citizens United
and their attempt to distribute a documentary entitled, Hillary: The Movie. Hillary,
released in 2008, is a ―ninety-minute documentary about then-Senator and presidential
candidate Hillary Clinton‖ (Gilpatrick, 2010). Citizens United intended to ―pay cable
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companies to make the film available for free through video-on-demand, which allows
digital cable subscribers to select programming from various menus, including movies‖
(―Court Case Abstracts,‖ 2010). The documentary was to be released through on-demand
services within 30 days of presidential primaries (―Court Case Abstracts,‖ 2010).
Citizens United‘s position was that the timing of the documentary‘s release would
be in violation of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) (Gilpatrick,
2010). BCRA ―prohibits corporations and labor unions from using their general treasury
funds to make electioneering communications or for speech that expressly advocates the
election or defeat of a federal candidate‖ (―Court Case Abstracts,‖ 2010). Under BCRA,
an ―electioneering communication is generally defined as ‗any broadcast, cable or
satellite communication‘ that is ‗publicly distributed‘ and refers to a clearly identified
federal candidate and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general
election‖ (―Court Case Abstracts,‖ 2010). As a result, ―Citizens United sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against the Commission in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, arguing that the ban on corporate electioneering communications at
2 U.S.C. §441b was unconstitutional as applied to the film and that disclosure and
disclaimer requirements were unconstitutional as applied to the film and the three ads for
the movie‖ (―Court Case Abstracts,‖ 2010). The preliminary injunction was denied by
the District Court but they did grant the Commission‘s motion for summary judgment
(―Court Case Abstracts,‖ 2010).
Citizens United is a case centered on the corporate restrictions of BCRA. The
Supreme Court ruling overturned the 1990 Court case, Austin v. Michigan State Chamber
of Commerce, where ―[t]he Court affirmed the concept that curbing the capability of the
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corporate form to expend disproportionate resources to influence elections was a
sufficiently important government interest to restrict speech‖ (―COMMENTS: Citizens
United,‖ 2010). Portions of the Court case McConnell v. FEC were also overturned in
addition to provisions in BCRA that prohibit corporate expenditures on electioneering
communications (―COMMENTS: Citizens United,‖ 2010). The Citizens United ruling
allows ―corporations and unions free to speak and spend independently of candidates
during elections for the first time in decades‖ (―COMMENTS: Citizens United,‖ 2010).
The subsequent chapters will discuss the scope of the Court‘s decision as well as
the current state of corporate speech in light of Citizens United. The majority opinion
and dissent will be framed in terms of free speech as liberty and free speech as equality.
Further discussion will include current disclosure and disclaimer laws and what reform, if
any, may come as a result of the Citizens United ruling.
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The Majority
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could
silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensable to decision making
in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation
rather than an individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for
informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation,
association, union, or individual.
-First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti

In writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy cites Justice Scalia‘s assertion from
the case FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL) that ―Austin was a significant
departure from ancient First Amendment principles‖ and speaking on behalf of the
majority states that ―[w]e agree with that conclusion and hold that stare decisis does not
compel the continued acceptance of Austin‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). Adding that
―[t]he Government may regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer and
disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether‖ (Citizens United
v. FEC, 2010).
Justice Kennedy disagrees with Citizens United‘s claim that Hillary is a
documentary ―[u]nder the standard stated in McConnell and further elaborated in WRTL, the
film qualifies as the functional equivalent of express advocacy‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).
Citizens United contends that the method in which they intend to distribute Hillary, video-ondemand, does not qualify under §441b of BCRA due to a ―lower risk of distorting the

political process than do television ads‖ since each viewer is required to complete a series
of steps confirming the intent to view (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). Justice Kennedy
contends, ―[w]hile some means of communication may be less effective than others at
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influencing the public in different contexts, any effort by the Judiciary to decide which
means of communications are to be preferred for the particular type of message and
speaker would raise questions as to the courts‘ own lawful authority‖ (Citizens United v.
FEC, 2010).
Justice Kennedy draws concern for ―chilling protected speech‖ and cites Chief
Justice Roberts‘s contention from WRTL that First Amendment standards ―must give the
benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling speech‖ (Citizens United v. FEC,
2010). Justice Kennedy adds, ―the Court cannot resolve this case on a narrower ground
without chilling political speech, speech that is central to the meaning and purpose of the
First Amendment‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). As a result, ―the lack of a valid basis
for an alternative ruling requires full consideration of the continuing effect of the speech
suppression upheld in Austin‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).
In citing a corporations ability to create a PAC and the First Amendment concerns
of §441b, Justice Kennedy contends that PACs are ―burdensome alternatives‖ that are
―expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations‖ (Citizens United v. FEC,
2010). In regards to the Government‘s ability to regulate content of speech, Justice
Kennedy writes that ―[t]he Government may not by these means deprive the public of the
right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of
consideration‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). Noting that ―[t]he First Amendment
protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow from each‖ (Citizens United v. FEC,
2010). The majority finds that there is ―no basis for the proposition that, in the context of
political speech, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers‖
citing that ―history and logic lead us to this conclusion‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).
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Justice Kennedy discusses the issue of independent expenditure bans in United
States v. Automobile Workers. The Court did not address the constitutional questions of
the case and remanded for the trial to proceed (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). The
dissent, authored by Justice Douglas and joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Black, argued that the Court should have addressed ―the constitutional question and that
the ban on independent expenditures was unconstitutional‖ (Citizens United v. FEC,
2010):
Under our Constitution it is We The People who are sovereign. The people have the final say. The
legislators are their spokesmen. The people determine through their votes the destiny of the nation.
It is therefore important—vitally important—that all channels of communications be open to them
during every election, that no point of view be restrained or barred, and that the people have
access to the views of every group in the community.

In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Court did not address ―the
constitutionality of the State‘s ban on corporate independent expenditures to support
candidates‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). In Citizens United, the majority contends
the Court addressed the issue, ―that restriction would have been unconstitutional under
Belloti‘s central principle: that the First Amendment does not allow political speech
restrictions based on a speaker‘s corporate identity‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).
Justice Kennedy cites the Court‘s view on the First Amendment rights of corporations as
evidence ―when it struck down a state-law prohibition on corporate independent
expenditures related to referenda issues (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010):
We thus find no support in the First . . . Amendment, or in the decisions of this Court, for the
proposition that speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the First Amendment
loses that protection simply because its source is a corporation that cannot prove, to the
satisfaction of a court, a material effect on its business or property. . . . [That proposition] amounts
to an impermissible legislative prohibition of speech based on the identity of the interests that
spokesmen may represent in public debate over controversial issues and a requirement that the
speaker have a sufficiently great interest in the subject to justify communication.
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In Austin, Justice Kennedy states in the dissent that the case ―uph[eld] a direct
restriction on the independent expenditure of funds for political speech for the first time
in [this Court‘s] history‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). Justice Kennedy contends that
the Court bypassed prior rulings in Buckley and Belloti by identifying an antidistortion
interest in limiting political speech (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). The majority views
this as ―conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin line that forbids restrictions on
political speech based on the speaker‘s corporate identity and a post-Austin line that
permits them‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). Justice Kennedy argues that the media
exemption invalidates the antidistortion rationale (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010):
Again by its own terms, the law exempts some corporations but covers others, even though both
have the need or the motive to communicate their views. The exemption applies to media
corporations owned or controlled by corporations that have diverse and substantial investments
and participate in endeavors other than news. So even assuming the most doubtful proposition that
a news organization has a right to speak when others do not, the exemption would allow a
conglomerate that owns both a media business and an unrelated business to influence or control
the media in order to advance its overall business interest. At the same time, some other
corporation, with an identical business interest but no media outlet in its ownership structure,
would be forbidden to speak or inform the public about the same issue. This differential treatment
cannot be squared with the First Amendment.

In overruling Austin, the majority found that ―[n]o sufficient governmental
interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations‖
(Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). Adding that the Court is ―further required to overrule the
part of McConnell that upheld BCRA §203‘s extension of §441b‘s restrictions on
corporate independent expenditures‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). Justice Kennedy
cites McConnell‘s reliance on the antidistortion rationale and refers to it as ―unconvincing
and insufficient‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).
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Free Speech as Liberty
Professor Kathleen M. Sullivan frames the Citizens United case from the
perspective of two concepts of freedom of speech: free speech as equality and free speech
as liberty. The basis of free speech as liberty centers around the notion that speech is not
defined by the source but by the speech itself, ―[i]n this view, the Free Speech Clause
serves the end of liberty, checking government overreaching into the private order‖
(Sullivan, 2010). Since the Free Speech Clause is open to be interpreted as protecting
speech instead of persons, the clause ―suggests that its core concern is negative rather
than affirmative – to restrain government from ‗abridging…speech‘ rather than to protect
‗rights‘ that require the antecedent step of identifying appropriate right holders‖
(Sullivan, 2010). Under this interpretation, the clause is indifferent to who is speaking
but ―suggests that it protects a system or process of ‗free speech,‘ not the rights of any
determinate speakers‖ (Sullivan, 2010).
In contrast to the redistributive qualities of free speech as equality, free speech as
liberty suggests that ―the audience of citizen listeners is best situated to evaluate political
speech without government intervention aimed at reshaping the dialogue of achieving
some preferred distributional end state in which the government deems speaking power
sufficiently diversified‖ (Sullivan, 2010). The Citizens United majority quotes from
Buckley v. Valeo and in essence draws a clear distinction between both concepts of free
speech, ―[t]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment‖ (Sullivan, 2010).
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In writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy argues against paternalism and views
any corporate political ads, be it toxic or enlightening, are best left to the public: ―The
Government may not…deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine for itself
what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration‖ (Sullivan, 2010). Justice
Kennedy‘s interpretation further distances the two concepts of speech on the
Government‘s role in protecting and restricting based on content or speaker.
Sullivan concludes her interpretation of the ruling by stating, ―the majority
opinion and concurrences in Citizens United see freedom of speech as forbidding the
reordering of private political speech for redistributive or paternalistic reasons, reflecting
a fear that government intervention is a more pernicious threat to the distribution of
speech than is any supposed vast accumulation of private capital‖ (Sullivan, 2010). The
perception being that the private, free market will regulate itself.
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The Dissent
In the dissent, Justice Stevens questions the Court‘s interpretation of campaign
finance precedent and referred to the decision as ―a dramatic break from our past‖ and
characterizes that majority opinion as ―rest[ing] on a faulty understanding of Austin and
McConnell and of our campaign finance jurisprudence more generally‖ (Citizens United
v. FEC, 2010). Referring to the majority‘s contention that the Court was asked to
reconsider Austin and McConnell, Justice Stevens states that it ―would be more accurate
if rephrased to state that ‗we have asked ourselves‘ to reconsider those cases‖ (Citizens
United v. FEC, 2010).
In District Court, Citizens United presented a facial challenge to BCRA §203,
later abandoning that claim and advised the Court that it was raising ―an as-applied
challenge to the constitutionality of…BCRA §203‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). The
distinction being that an as-applied challenge would affect Citizens United only. Justice
Stevens writes that ―[t]he jurisdictional statement never so much as cited Austin, the key
case the majority today overrules‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). Adding ―even in its
merits briefing, when Citizens United injected its request to overrule Austin, it never
sought a declaration that §203 was facially unconstitutional as to all corporations and
unions; instead it argued only that the statute could not be applied to it because it was
‗funded overwhelmingly by individuals‘‖ CU Opinion, 2011).
Justice Stevens contends that the majority‘s ―unnecessary resort to a facial inquiry
‗runs[s] contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint that courts should
neither anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding
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it nor formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied‘‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). The dissent refers to the
majority‘s decision to apply a facial ruling as based in pure speculation: ―[h]ad Citizens
United maintained a facial challenge, and thus argued that there are virtually no
circumstances in which BCRA §203 can be applied constitutionally, the parties could
have developed, through the normal process of litigation, a record about the actual effects
of §203, its actual burdens and its actual benefits, on all manner of corporations and
unions‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). Justice Stevens adds that ―[i]n this case, the
record is not simply incomplete or unsatisfactory; it is nonexistent‖ (Citizens United v.
FEC, 2010).
The majority‘s assumption is ―that a facial ruling is necessary because anything
less would chill too much protected speech‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). Justice
Stevens argues that ―this claim rests on the assertion that some significant number of
corporations have been cowed into quiescence by FEC ‗censor[ship]‘‖ (Citizens United
v. FEC, 2010). The dissent references the standard set in WRTL that regulation of
corporate communication under §203 is permissible as long as it was ―susceptible of no
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). Adding that ―[t]he Court does not explain
how, in the span of a single election cycle, it has determined THE CHIEF JUSTICE‘s
project to be a failure‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).
The majority asserts that despite Citizens United dropping its facial challenge at
the District Court level, they ―nevertheless preserved it—not as a freestanding ‗claim.‘
but as a potential argument in support of ‗a claim that the FEC has violated its First
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Amendment right to free speech‘‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). Justice Stevens
rejects this argument (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010):
By this novel logic, virtually any submission could be reconceptualized as ‗a claim that the
Government has violated my rights,‘ and it would then be available to the Court to entertain any
conceivable issue that might be relevant to that claim‘s disposition. Not only the as-applied/facial
distinction, but the basic relationship between litigants and courts, would be upended if the latter
had free rein to construe the former‘s claims at such high levels of generality. There would be no
need for plaintiffs to argue their case; they could just cite the constitutional provisions they think
relevant, and leave the rest to us.

The dissent argues that the majority‘s decision to overrule Austin and McConnell
is founded in a disagreement of the results. Justice Stevens writes, ―[v]irtually every one
of its arguments was made and rejected in those cases, and the majority opinion is
essentially an amalgamation of resuscitated dissents‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).
Adding that the ―only relevant thing that has changed since Austin and McConnell is the
composition of this Court‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). Justice Stevens characterizes
the ruling as ―strik[ing] at the vitas of stare decisis, ‗the means by which we ensure that
the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible
fashion‘ that ‗permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law
rather than in the proclivities of individuals‘‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).
Justice Stevens addresses the Court‘s analysis of a ―‗categorical ba[n]‘ on
corporate speech‖ noting that the majority references a ―ban‖ on 29 of its 64 pages.
Justice Stevens refers to this as ―highly misleading, and need[ing] to be corrected‖
(Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). Provisions of Austin and McConnell have allowed
corporations ―exemptions for PACs, separate segregated funds established by a
corporation for political purposes‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). Justice Stevens adds
that ―[u]nder BCRA, any corporation‘s ‗stockholders and their families‘ can pool their
resources to finance electioneering communications‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).

Corporate Speech in the Wake of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission

13

Justice Stevens states that ―[t]he Court invokes ‗ancient First Amendment
principles,‘ and original understandings to defend today‘s ruling, yet it makes only a
perfunctory attempt to ground its analysis in the principles or understandings of those
who drafted and ratified the Amendment‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). To which
Justice Stevens adds, ―[t]o the extent that the Framers‘ views are discernible and relevant
to the disposition of this case, they would appear to cut strongly against the majority‘s
position‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). Justice Stevens supports his position with a
description of the role corporations played under the Framers (Citizens United v. FEC,
2010):
This is not only because the Framers and their contemporaries conceived of speech more narrowly
than we now think of it, but also because they held very different views about the nature of the
First Amendment right and the role of corporations in society. Those few corporations that existed
at the founding were authorized by grant of a special legislative charter. Corporate sponsors would
petition the legislature, and the legislature, if amenable, would issue a charter that specified the
corporation‘s powers and purposes and ‗authoritatively fixed the scope and content of corporate
organization,‘ including ‗the internal structure of the corporation.‘ Corporations were created,
supervised, and conceptualized as quasi-public entities, ‗designed to serve a social function for the
state.‘ It was ‗assumed that [they] were legally privileged organizations that had to be closely
scrutinized by the legislature because their purposes had to be made consistent with public
welfare.‘

Justice Stevens cites Thomas Jefferson‘s concerns regarding corporations impact
on the Republic, ―I hope we shall…crush in [its] birth the aristocracy of our monied
corporations which dare already to challenge our government to a trial of strength and bid
defiance to the laws of our country‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). Adding that ―[t]he
Framers thus took it as a given that corporations could be comprehensively regulated in
the service of the public welfare‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).
The dissent argues that the majority bases its rejection of Austin on ―[s]elected
passages from two cases, Buckley and Bellotti‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). The
majority references Chief Justice Roberts from Buckley that ―[t]he concept of government
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may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment‖ (Citizens United v. FEC,
2010). Justice Stevens argues that the ―Constitution does, in fact, permit numerous
‗restrictions on the speech of some in order to prevent a few from drowning out the
many‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). Justice Stevens questions the relevancy of the
quote from Buckley stating that it was used in evaluating ―the ancillary governmental
interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the
outcome of elections‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). Adding that ―when we made this
statement in Buckley, we could not have been casting doubt on the restriction on
corporate expenditures in candidate elections, which had not been challenged as ‗foreign
to the First Amendment,‘ or for any other reason‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).
Addressing Bellotti, Justice Stevens states that the case was ruled ―in an explicit
limitation on the scope of its holding, that ‗our consideration of a corporation‘s right to
speak on issues of general public interest implies no comparable right in the quite
different context of participation in a political campaign for election to public office‖
(Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). And ―[i]n the Court‘s view, Buckley and Bellotti
decisively rejected the possibility of distinguishing corporations from natural persons in
the 1970‘s; it just so happens that in every single case in which the Court has reviewed
campaign finance legislation in the decades since, the majority failed to grasp this truth‖
(Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).
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Free Speech as Equality
In Professor Sullivan‘s other concept of freedom of speech, free speech as
equality, she states that ―Free speech as equality embraces first an antidiscrimination
principle: in upholding the speech rights of anarchists, syndicalists, communists, civil
rights marchers, Maoist flag burners, and other marginal, dissident, or unorthodox
speakers, the Court protects members of ideological minorities who are likely to be the
target of the majority‘s animus or selective indifference‖ (Sullivan, 2010). Sullivan states
that the dissent ―relies centrally on the point that limitations on the use of general
corporate treasuries for independent expenditures in support of or in opposition to
political candidates are ‗viewpoint-neutral regulations based on content and identity,‘ not
embodiments of ‗invidious discrimination or preferential treatment of a politically
powerful group‘‖ (Sullivan, 2010).
Justice Stevens‘ argument suggests that as long as government is not regulating
the content of what is said but instead the speaker, the First Amendment is not abridged:
―speech can be regulated differentially on account of the speaker‘s identity, when identity
is understood in categorical or institutional terms‖ (Sullivan, 2010). In defending
Congress‘ differential treatment of corporations and ―natural persons‖ the dissenting view
maintains that corporations are compelled to ―engage the political process in instrumental
terms‖ as means to ―maximize shareholder value‖ in contrast to the advancement of ―any
broader notion of the public good‖ (Sullivan, 2010).
The concerns of Justice Stevens‘ dissent center around the ―drowning out of
noncorporate voices‖ by ―corporate domination of the airwaves prior to an election‖
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(Sullivan, 2010). Sullivan explains Justice Stevens‘ dissent as an embodiment of free
speech as equality: ―On this view, political equality is prior to speech: when freedom of
speech enhances political equality, speech prevails; when speech is regulated to enhance
political equality, however, regulation prevails‖ (Sullivan, 2010). The idea being that
speech by the mainstream or majority will prevail over those of the minority to a degree
that the government needs to protect the dissenting view from political suppression.
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Current Disclosure and Disclaimer Laws
In the context of current disclosure and disclaimer laws, corporate speech can be
divided into two relevant categories: independent expenditures and electioneering
communications. A typical definition of independent expenditures is identified in
Arkansas law (Winik, 2010):
An "independent expenditure" is any expenditure which is not a contribution and:
(A) Expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for office;
(B) Is made without arrangement, cooperation, or consultation between any candidate or any
authorized committee or agent of the candidate and the person making the expenditure or any
authorized agent of that person; and
(C) Is not made in concert with or at the request or suggestion of any candidate or any authorized
committee or agent of the candidate.

Electioneering communication is defined by speech that references a candidate
and is within a timeframe prior to the election. Under federal law, electioneering
communication must meet three standards. It must ―refer[] to a clearly identified
candidate for Federal office‖ and must be ―susceptible of no reasonable interpretation
other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate‖ (Winik, 2010). It must
also occur ―within . . . 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office
sought by the candidate; or . . . 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a
convention or caucus‖ (Winik, 2010). Lastly, ―in a congressional race, it must be capable
of being ‗received by 50,000 or more persons‘ in the relevant jurisdiction‖ (Winik, 2010).
Regulation is broken into disclosure and disclaimer requirements. Speakers are
required under disclosure regulations ―to file with the government a public accounting of
the money they have spent to support a given candidate‖ (Winik, 2010). Disclaimer
regulations ―require that speakers identify themselves in their communications rather than
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merely in filings with an agency‖ (Winik, 2010). In contrast with disclosure regulations,
―[d]isclaimers convey less information than disclosures – a few seconds in a television
spot, rather than a detailed form – but they are more vivid and accessible‖ (Winik, 2010).
Federal law requires disclosures for ―‗[e]very person . . . who makes independent
expenditures . . . in excess of $250 during a calendar year,‘ as well as disclosure of
‗disbursement[s] for the direct costs of producing and airing electioneering
communications in . . . excess of $10,000 during any calendar year‘‖ (Winik, 2010).
Although ―disclosure is required only for express advocacy, except during the brief preelection window – sixty days for a general election, thirty days for a primary – when it is
required for speech ‗susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to
vote for or against a specific candidate‘‖ (Winick, 2010).
In addition to federal law, ―thirty-four states require disclosure of independent
expenditures‖ (Winik, 2010). The states generally follow the language outlined in
Arkansas law, ―though some do not make explicit the requirement that advocacy be
‗express,‘ and others do not mandate that the candidate in question be ‗clearly
identified‘‖ (Winik, 2010). A few states ―do not use the term ‗advocacy‘ at all‖ (Winik,
2010).
Federal law requires the use of disclaimers for electioneering communications as
well as independent expenditures. Only three states, Illinois, South Dakota, and West
Virginia require disclaimers for both electioneering communications and independent
expenditures (Winik, 2010). Two states ―Louisiana and Vermont require disclaimers
only for electioneering communications, while twelve states require disclaimers only for
express advocacy‖ (Winik, 2010). There are nine states that ―require disclaimers for all

Corporate Speech in the Wake of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission

19

independent advocacy regardless of whether the advocacy is ‗express‘ (Winik, 2010).
While ―[f]ive states purport to impose a much broader disclaimer requirement, covering
even nonadvocacy communications‖ (Winik, 2010). Overall, ―in the vast majority of
states, and at the federal level, electoral communications that stay outside the bounds of
direct advocacy or the narrow strictures of electioneering communications carry no
disclaimer requirement at all‖ (Winik, 2010).
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Citizens Informed
In the context of congressional reform, little has been done since the Citizens
United ruling. In 2010, the United State House of Representatives passed the
DISCLOSE Act ―[b]ut the bill died in the Senate, and even had it passed, its scope would
have been limited to electioneering communications and express candidate advocacy or
its functional equivalent‘ (Winik, 2010). The DISCLOSE Act ―would have broadened
slightly the definitions of those activities but done nothing to address the wider array of
corporate political speech that neither ‗expressly advocat[es] the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate‘ nor ‗refers to a clearly identified candidate‘ in such a way as
to be susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or
against‘ that candidate‖ (Winik, 2010). Any meaningful reform to corporate electoral
speech should be designed to inform the public of the corporate speaker. The disclosure
of the corporate speaker will allow citizens the opportunity to add context to the
advocacy they are presented with.
In Citizens Informed, Daniel Winik discusses the importance and constitutionality
for the ―broader disclosure and disclaimer of corporate electoral communications,
extending to speech beyond direct advocacy‖ (Winik, 2010). The rationale being that
―disclosure and disclaimer requirements might actually do better than outright prohibition
in achieving the informational and anticorruption objectives that have long been central
to reform efforts‖ (Winik, 2010). Winik limits the context within the confines of what
―the Supreme Court has deemed constitutionally legitimate in this field, which notably
do[es] not include equality‖ (Winik, 2010).
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Any discussion of disclosure and disclaimer requirements must take note of the
government‘s ability to regulate and whether any proposal would withstand judicial
review in light of stare decisis. Regarding FECA‘s disclosure requirement the Buckley
Court found that ―compelled disclosure can always conceivably chill association or
speech,‖ but that ―the First Amendment provides even greater protection for anonymity
when a group or individual demonstrates a ‗reasonable probability that the compelled
disclosure . . . will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either
Government officials or private parties‘‖ (Winik, 2010). Buckley identified ―three strong
governmental interests against anonymity – informing the electorate, preventing
corruption, and enforcing other regulations‖ (Winik, 2010). The Court held ―that, except
in instances of probable reprisal, the federal government‘s specific disclosure interests in
FECA outweighed the inherent right to anonymity‖ (Winik, 2010).
In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets
at a public meeting on a proposed school tax levy. No mention of the author was
included on the leaflets and Mrs. McIntyre ―was charged with violating an Ohio law
against anonymous political publications‖ (Winik, 2010). The Court concluded that ―in
the case of a handbill written by a private citizen who is not known to the recipient, the
name and address of the author add little, if anything, to the reader‘s ability to evaluate
the document‘s message‖ (Winik, 2010). In her concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg
wrote that this case did ―not thereby hold that the State may not in other, larger
circumstances require the speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing its identity‖
(Winik, 2010).
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Recently, the Court addressed the issue of anonymity in Doe v. Reed where they
―considered the use of Washington‘s Public Records Act to reveal the signers of petitions
for a referendum against same-sex civil unions‖ (Winik, 2010). Winik states that ―Doe
does little to clarify how far the right to anonymity extends because the sort of political
activity with which it dealt fell within the state‘s prerogative to regulate elections‖
(Winik, 2010). Adding that ―Doe may be notable for its 8-1 margin, with only Justice
Thomas writing – as in Citizens United – to defend a broad right against disclosure‖
(Winik, 2010). Justice Scalia‘s concurrence in judgment called for ―an absolute mandate
for disclosure regulations‖ (Winik, 2010).
According to Winik, ―[t]he purpose of disclosure and disclaimer provisions is to
facilitate the full and fair consideration of electoral advocacy after its entry into public
discourse‖ (Winik, 2010). Justice Holmes wrote, ―the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market‖ (Winik, 2010). If this
is so, ―then disclosure and disclaimer help the market to function‖ (Winik, 2010). Winik
cites Alexander Meiklejohn‘s theory of the First Amendment as support (Winik, 2010):
The importance of complete information in the public sphere is central to Alexander Meiklejohn's
theory of the First Amendment, which has profoundly influenced First Amendment jurisprudence.
The purpose of the First Amendment, Meiklejohn writes, ―is to give to every voting member of
the body politic the fullest possible participation in the understanding of those problems with
which the citizens of a self-governing society must deal.‖ To ensure ―that all the citizens shall, so
far as possible, understand the issues which bear upon our common life,‖ the First Amendment
provides that ―no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no belief, no counterbelief, no relevant information,
may be kept from them.‖

A way that corporate voices are informative in the electoral process is by
notifying citizens of policies or candidates that would have an adverse impact, in their
estimation, on the economy and job creation. A reasoned example of this was on display
in the proposed advertisement at the heart of the Austin case, ―[t]he Chamber of
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Commerce not only disclosed its corporate interests but explained, in seven paragraphs of
reasoned prose, why its proposals (in Mr. Badstra‘s hands) would benefit all
Michiganders by ‗making Michigan more competitive for business investment and job
creation‖‘ (Winik, 2010). While this is not representative of corporate political
advocacy, it must also be considered alongside more negative or misleading advocacy.
Disclosure and disclaimer requirements benefit voters in the sense that ―the
affiliation of a candidate with particular interest groups – just like the candidate‘s party
affiliation – can be a powerful heuristic for voters‖ (Winik, 2010). In Austin, ―[t]he very
fact that the Chamber of Commerce endorses Richard Bandstra means something to
voters, regardless of what the Chamber says about him‖ (Winik, 2010). Endorsements
are an integral part of elections and ―time-starved voters really do inform themselves by
such basic cues as which corporation stands behind which candidate‖ (Winik, 2010).
An outright ban of corporate electoral advocacy would only provide a ―deceptive
sense of insulation from corporate influence‖ (Winik, 2010). Doing so would only
encourage corporations to keep their influence hidden from the public. Winik adds that
―one of the potential benefits of a more open regime: when corporations contribute to
public discourse through mass advertising, rather than back-channel influence, ‗all can
judge‘ the ‗content and purpose‘ of their speech‖ (Winik, 2010). This is not to assume
that private discourse will not take place between corporations and politicians but ―to the
extent that their public priorities align with those they communicate in private, the
electorate will at least glimpse what its representatives are seeing behind closed doors‖
(Winik, 2010).

Corporate Speech in the Wake of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission

24

In defending the constitutionality of broader disclosure and disclaimer
regulations, Winik describes corporations as ―inherently public entities‖ and that they
―are public actors because they exist only through a publicly granted privilege‖ (Winik,
2010). A counterargument would be ―that the requirement for corporations to act
publicly in the economic market place does not, on its own, legitimate market pressures
on their political speech‖ (Winik, 2010). The implication being that the corporation has
two voices, an economic voice that is inherently public and a political voice that is
inherently private. This rationale would argue that corporations, like individuals, have a
public life and a subsequent private life in which they are allowed to retreat into
anonymity. Winik believes that ―[c]orporations have no constitutive interest in privacy,
just as they have no constitutive interest in speech‖ (Winik, 2010). As stated by thenJustice Rehnquist, ―To ascribe to [corporations] an ‗intellect‘ or ‗mind‘ for freedom of
conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality‖ (Winik, 2010).
Winik states that a starting point for reform would be ―a standard that would
cover all (l) public communications that (2) any corporation (3) funds and that (4) can
reasonably be expected to (5) influence an election‖ (Winik, 2010). Public
communication ―concerns whether a regulation covers all corporate speech or only public
speech‖ (Winik, 2010). Any corporation speaks to whether exemptions would be
allowed or if it would be all encompassing. Funds ―concerns whether a regulation covers
communications funded by corporations or only those ‗spoken‘ by corporations in the
most immediate sense‖ (Winik, 2010). The fourth parameter, ―can reasonably be
expected to,‖ covers ―whether a regulation is enforced objectively or subjectively‖
(Winik, 2010). Winik describes the final parameter as ―the most important‖ and defines
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―what political communications are covered‖ (Winik, 2010). Beyond direct advocacy,
this is difficult to define. As Winik states, ―legislators would court constitutional peril by
intruding in the domain of corporate speech not tied to any electoral consequence‖
(Winik, 2010).
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Sullivan’s Reform Options
Sullivan provides four possible political reforms that could arise from the Citizens
United ruling: ―first, invalidating limits on political contributions directly to candidates;
second, allowing independent electoral expenditures by nonprofit but not for profit
corporations; third, increasing disclosure and disclaimer requirements for corporations
making expenditures in connection with political campaigns; and fourth, conditioning
receipt of various government benefits to corporations on their limiting political
campaign expenditures‖ (Sullivan, 2010). The first and fourth options would favor those
inclined to agree with the Citizens United majority while the second option would favor
those who side with the dissent and lastly, the third option may appeal to both sides.
In the first option, Sullivan suggests getting rid of hard money contribution limits
to candidates. To do so would be repealing federal campaign laws that stretch back to the
―Tillman Act of 1907 that prohibit corporations from giving directly to political
candidates from their own treasuries‖ (Sullivan, 2010). In addition, ―Congress could
eliminate the amount of limitations on contributions to candidate campaigns from any
source, corporate or otherwise‖ (Sullivan, 2010). Sullivan defends her point by
addressing the inherent discrepancy in allowing seemingly unlimited funds directed to
non-candidate electioneering but not directly to the candidates themselves. By
―[a]llowing unfettered contributions directly to candidates, who are accountable to voters,
might also decrease the concern of free speech as equality proponents that corporatefunded ads will be particularly toxic, debasing public dialogue and undermining a
desirable end state of diverse political ideas‖ (Sullivan, 2010).

Corporate Speech in the Wake of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission

27

Sullivan‘s first proposal merits consideration but would ultimately struggle to
pass muster with a skeptical electorate and a liberal Senate and president. As campaign
spending reaches previously unthinkable levels, candidates may soon have to defend their
coffers to an economically struggling electorate who could resent the level of corporate
campaign donations when their jobs are being laid off. This point could be argued on
both sides of the debate but given recent trends, election spending has not crested.
Another critique of this proposal would be, ―why?‖ Why would a corporation
give directly to a candidate when they have much more anonymity circumventing
candidates in order to reach the same end game? Corporations may have their agendas to
push but they tend to favor the issue over the candidate. It is far simpler to separate
themselves from the shortcomings of candidates when they can retreat in their support of
a particular issue.
Sullivan‘s second proposal involves drawing the line between for-profit and nonprofit organizations. Under this proposal, only non-profit organizations would benefit
from the Citizens United ruling. This would be a departure from the Court ruling in
which both sides appeared unwillingly to differentiate what constitutes a corporation.
The majority defines speech as not being limited to who the speaker is while on the
dissent, speech is left alone to persons while excluding all corporations regardless of size,
type or affiliation. Based on this understanding and the opinion of the Court in Citizens
United regarding ―chilling speech,‖ this proposal would likely face judicial scrutiny.
The third proposal would make ―disclosure and disclaimer rules for corporate
electoral expenditures more robust, as embodied in portions of legislative proposals like
the eponymous DISCLOSE Act, would appear to align the libertarian and egalitarian
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visions of free speech‖ (Sullivan, 2010). Disclosure requirements are likely to be more
appealing to free speech as equality advocates due to interest group monitoring that
would serve as a deterrent to large corporations disproportionately supporting particular
issues over others.
Support from free speech as liberty advocates is probable but inherently more
complicated. For one, ―liberty‖ proponents are against government oversight to begin
with. While disclosure requirements do not directly relate to oversight, it does remove
the autonomy in which no disclosure requirements would allow corporations to push their
agenda without reprisal. Although, disclosure requirements may be the closest
compromise that liberty proponents get without additional government intervention as to
additional restrictions to corporate speech.
The final proposal would ―make restrictions on corporate electoral speech a
condition of the receipt of government benefits‖ (Sullivan, 2010). While similar
practices are used as a safeguard against misappropriation of government funds, there are
serious questions about this proposal. On one side, you have ―liberals who, on free
speech as equality grounds, dislike government‘s use of its leverage to exact conformity
as the price of reliance upon government resources‖ (Sullivan, 2010). While
conservatives may view the restrictions as being, ―so burdensome as to amount to a ‗ban‘
on political speech‖ (Sullivan, 2010). Given the bureaucratic nightmare such a restriction
would cause, this proposal would likely lack a modicum of support needed to even pass
its way out of committee.
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Conclusion
The issues addressed in Citizens United are crucial to the public due to the impact
they have on electoral speech but also the protections granted to corporations. The case
provides a unique interpretation to the First Amendment whose ramifications are not
limited to electoral speech but may extend into the commercial speech doctrine (Piety,
2010).
The opinion in Citizens United is replete with rhetoric identifying corporations as
―citizens,‖ as if they were real persons. This characterization bolsters arguments for
treating commercial speech like fully protected speech because it trains the analysis on
the speaker instead of the listener. The majority of the Court is sympathetic to the
argument for more protection for commercial speech and Citizens United reflects that
sympathy. It suggests that with the proper case, there is an increased likelihood the
Supreme Court will either do away with the commercial speech doctrine altogether and
declare the commercial speech should be treated as fully protected speech, or it will
nominally retain the doctrine but apply strict scrutiny review.

Professor Tamara R. Piety‘s stance is that by extending First Amendment rights to
corporations we are providing a host of legal arguments for additional freedoms, ―if a forprofit corporation is entitled to First Amendment protection when it engages in political
speech—speech which is in some sense peripheral to its existence—then it would seem
full protection for its core expressive activity should follow‖ (Piety, 2010). The issue that
Piety raises brings to light the unintended (or perhaps intended) consequences of court
rulings. By bringing corporations into the First Amendment fold, a number of other
protections are certain to be tested in court cases for the foreseeable future.
The Court‘s opinion in Citizens United has stirred controversy among campaign
finance scholars and advocates ranging from outrage to complete agreement. The
decision was at center stage during the 2010 State of the Union address when President
Obama criticized the ruling and cameras caught Justice Alito verbally disagreeing with
the president. Instead of trying to jam the proverbial genie back into the bottle, perhaps,
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as Daniel Winik states, legislators should ―set their sights on a different path, not only
reinforcing disclosure and disclaimer regulations within the previously regulated sphere
but expanding those regulations beyond direct candidate advocacy to a broader range of
corporate political speech‖ (Winik, 2010). Winik contends that this approach would not
only be ―constitutionally legitimate; it also might turn out to be more effective than the
pre-Citizens United regime in informing the electorate‖ (Winik, 2010).
It is too soon to draw any lasting impressions from the Citizens United ruling. As
it stands, the ruling provides corporations the opportunity to influence elections outside
of any significant disclosure and disclaimer requirements at an unprecedented level. The
full impact of Citizens United may not be felt for years to come. Much like a recession,
you are not fully aware that it has begun until you are already in it. To truly understand
the impact of this decision, additional research will be needed in the election cycles to
come as well as monitoring of any legislative and judicial challenge to current disclosure
and disclaimer laws.
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